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Causation Under the Escape Clause: The 
Case for Retaining the "Substantial 
Cause" Standard 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
I. Introduction 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974/ popularly known as the 
"escape clause," provides for major-albeit temporary-relief to an 
American industry suffering or threatened with serious injury caused 
by increased imports of competitive merchandise.2 Under the escape 
clause, the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) is 
required to make three findings before granting relief.s The ITC 
must first find that imports of competitive merchandise have in-
creased.· It must then examine whether the domestic industry in 
question has been seriously injured or is threatened with serious in-
jury:1 Finally, the Commission must determine whether the imports 
are a substantial cause of that injury or threat.6 This third factor is 
the focal point of this Article. 
This Article will begin by briefly discussing the history of sec-
tion 201. It will then examine the "substantial cause" standard and 
analyze a recent proposal by Congress to relax that standard. 
• A.B. 1973, University of Michigan; J.D. 1977, Wayne State University Law School; 
LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. The author is a trial attorney, Commercial Litigation 
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice. Previously the author was a law 
clerk at the United States Court of International Trade in New York City from 1982-1984. 
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and not those of the 
Department of Justice. 
I. 19 u.s.c. § 2251 (\982). Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436. 
deals with imports from Communist countries causing "market disruption. . . with respect to 
an article produced by a domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(l) (\982). The types and 
duration of relief available under § 406 are identical to those under § 201. except that the 
United States International Trade Commission cannot recommend to the President adjustment 
assistance in a § 406 determination. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(3) (1982). 
2. 19 U.S.c. § 2251(b)(l) (1982). The relief available under § 201 includes increased 
tariffs on the article causing injury, quantitative restrictions on the· article, tariff-rate quotas.' 
orderly marketing arrangements with foreign countries limiting exportation to the United 
States of the articles, or any combination of these actions. 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982). The 
duration of relief can be for as long as five years. Id. 
3. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982). 
4. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(I) (1982). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
185 
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II. Background 
The unique feature of section 201, distinguishing it from most 
other trade legislation, is its focus on fairly traded imports which 
happen to be causing injury to a competing American industry. 
Thus, a petitioner seeking escape clause relief is not required to show 
that imports are being sold at less than fair value within the United 
States (i.e., are being "dumped"), that they are being subsidized by 
a foreign government, or that they are otherwise being unfairly 
traded.7 
The explanation for granting such extraordinary relief from fair 
trade can be found in the report of the Senate Committee on 
Finance: 
The rationale for the escape clause has been, that as barriers to 
international trade are lowered, some industries and workers 
face serious injury, dislocation, and perhaps economic extinction. 
The escape clause is aimed at providing temporary relief for an 
industry suffering from serious injury, or the threat thereof, so 
that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer 
international competition.8 
Section 201 traces its roots to article XIX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).9 That article recognizes 
the possibility that GATT-negotiated trade and tariff concessions 
might result in serious injury and market disruption to a domestic 
industry within the country which has made the concession. Article 
XIX therefore permitted an "escape" from GATT obligations under 
such circumstances!O Although section 201 's predecessor provision 
required that the increase in imports be attributable to trade conces-
7. See. e.g., § 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979, 19 U.s.C. § 1671 (1982); § 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979,19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982); § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). 
8. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1974). 
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. pts. 5,6, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT). Article XIX provides in part: 
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the 
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, includ· 
ing tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of 
that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such condi· 
tions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that 
territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting parties 
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such 
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend 
the obligation in whole or in part or withdraw or modify the concession. 
Id. See J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 629·39 
( 1977). 
10. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 553·73 (1969) [hereinaf· 
ter cited as JACKSON). 
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sions,l1 that requirement was abandoned with the enactment of sec-
tion 201. 
Escape clause proceedings are a two-phase process. They are 
commenced by the filing of a petition with the ITC "by an entity 
... which is representative of an industry,"12 upon request of the 
President or Congress,13 or by the ITC on its own motion.H The first 
phase, to be completed within six months of the filing of the petition 
or request, U is conducted by the ITC which engages in fact finding 
and holds hearings. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the ITC de-
termines first, whether serious injury exists and, second, whether the 
injury is attributable to an increase in imports of competing mer-
chandise. If so, it recommends to the President the type and amount 
of relief it believes necessary to remedy the injury.16 The President 
in turn has sixty days from the date of the lTC's report to impose 
some form of relief.17 He may reject relief altogether, however, if he 
determines that such relief "is not in the national economic interest 
of the United States."16 
III. The "Substantial Cause" Standard 
The basic test for determining whether a petitioner or industry 
is entitled to relief under the escape clause is "whether an article is 
being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as 
to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to 
the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article."19 The term "substantial cause" is 
defined as "a cause which is important and not less than any other 
cause. "20 This is a dual test: the increase in imports must be both an 
II. Section 301(b)(l) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(l) 
(1970) (repealed 1975). 
12. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(I) (1982). See Berg, Petitioning and Responding Under the 
Escape Clause: One Practitioner's View on How To Do It, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Berg]; Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act 
of 1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and Its Interpretation by the International Trade Com-
mission, 52 IND. LJ. 535 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Adams & Dirlam]. 
13. 19 U.S.c. § 2251(b)(l) (1982). 
14. Id. 
15. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (d)(2) (1982). See Leonard & Foster, The Metamorphosis of the 
U.S. International Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719, 
730-49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Leonard & Foster]. 
16. 19 U.s.C. § 2251(d)(l) (1982). If the Commission issues a negative determination, 
the President has no power to act under § 201. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1982). 
17. 19 U.S.c. § 2252(b) (1982). Such relief may include imposition of or an increase 
in tariffs, quotas and orderly marketing arrangements, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1982), and may 
be initially ordered for a period of up to five years, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(l) (1982). 
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(I)(A) (1982). 
19. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(l) (1982). The basic test involves a four-part analysis: (I) 
what is the affected domestic industry; (2) are imports increasing; (3) is there serious injury or 
a threat thereof; and (4) are the imports a substantial cause of that injury or threat of injury. 
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1982). 
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important cause of serious injury and must also be a cause equal to 
or greater than any other cause.21 In settling upon this definition, 
however, Congress made clear that it did not intend the ITC to 
make its causation determinations with mathematical precision.22 
Three recent escape clause determinations are illustrative of the 
lTC's interpretation of "substantial cause." In one determination the 
ITC concluded that increased imports were not a substantial cause 
of serious injury,23 while in the other two it reached affirmative cau-
sa tion determinations. 24 
In Certain Canned Tuna Fish,2r. the ITC found that imports of 
canned tuna fish were increasing, and that the domestic industry was 
suffering serious injury. Nevertheless, the ITC found two causes of 
injury to be more important than increased imports. First, the ITC 
found that the domestic industry-particularly the fishing fleet-had 
overexpanded.26 Second, it found that the principal fishing grounds 
for tuna had shifted from the Eastern Pacific to the Western Pacific 
21. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 46-47 (1974); Note, An Examination of ITC Determinations on Imports: 
The Basis for "Substantiallnjury", 6 INT'L TRADE LJ. 242 (1980-81) [hereinafter cited as 
An Examination of ITC Determinations]. See also Note, Escape Clause Causation After the 
Auto Case: J.8 Million Japanese Imports As Less Than a Substantial Cause of Injury, 16 
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 299 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Escape Clause Causation]. 
Prior to enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the test for causation was more rigorous. It 
involved a determination of whether the increased imports were a "major cause" of injury. 
"Major" was understood to mean greater than all other factors combined. Section 301 (b)(l) 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(l) (1970) (repealed 1975). See An 
Examination of fTC Determinations. supra, at 243; Leonard & Foster, supra note 15, at 735. 
22. The Senate Finance Committee commented: 
Modification of the requirement that increased imports be the major cause 
of actual or threatened injury is necessary because "the major cause" has been 
interpreted as being a cause greater than all other causes combined (although 
there is some indication that in recent years the Commission has moved away 
from this standard). This has proved in many cases to be an unreasonably diffi-
cult standard to meet. Substantial cause is defined in the bill to mean a cause 
which is important and not less than any other cause. This requires that a dual 
test be met-increased imports must constitute an important cause and be no 
less important than any other single cause. 
The Committee recognizes that "weighing" causes in a dynamic economy is 
not always possible. It is not intended that a mathematical test be applied by the 
Commission. The Commissioners will have to assure themselves that imports re-
present a substantial cause or threat of injury, and not just one of a multitude of 
equal causes of threats of injury. It is not intended that the escape clause criteria 
go from one extreme of excessive rigidity to complete laxity. An industry must 
be seriously injured or threatened by an absolute increase in imports, and the 
imports must be deemed to be a substantial cause of the injury before an affirm-
ative determination should be made. 
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 21, at 120-21. 
23. Certain Canned Tuna Fish, No. TA-201-53, USITC Publication No. 1558 (Aug. 
1984). 
24. Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, No. TA-201-5I, USITC Publication No. 
1553 (July 1984); Unwrought Copper, No. TA-201-52, USITC Publication No. 1549 (July 
1984). 
25. No. TA-201-53, USITC Publication No. 1558 (Aug. 1984). 
26. fd. at 16 (views of Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr). 
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Ocean due to a warming of the Eastern Pacific.27 
In reaching this determination, the ITC majority noted the con-
gressional directive which states that in assessing the relative impor-
tance of various causes of injury 
the Commission . . . take into account all economic factors 
which it considers relevant, including (but not limited to)-
(C) with respect to substantial cause, an increase 
in imports (either actual or relative to domestic produc-
tion) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic 
market supplied by domestic producers.2s 
The ITC also declined an invitation to aggregate the various eco-
nomic factors and then compare them with the factor of increased 
imports.29 They found support for this noncumulation approach 
within the legislative history of section 201.30 Thus, even though im-
ports had increased, and even though the ITC refused to cumulate 
economic factors, it was still able to reach a negative causation de-
termination based on two other factors. 
In Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products,3} a divided ITC 
found increased imports of certain steel products to be a substantial 
cause of injury to the domestic steel industry.32 For two types of 
steel products, however, decline in demand and intraindustry compe-
tition were considered more important causes of injury than in-
creased imports.33 In their analysis of the causal connection between 
imports and serious injury, the ITC majority considered a variety of 
factors, including the upward trend in the volume of imports, the 
downward trend in domestic consumption and domestic shipments, 
pricing practices in the relevant markets, and the interrelationship of 
27. Id. This warming was attributed to the weather system known as "EI Nino." 
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (1982). 
29. No. TA-201-53, supra note 25, at 15. Cumulation of factors was obviously unnec-
essary here for those opposing the petition, since the ITC found two independent factors to be 
more important causes of injury than imports. 
30. No. TA-201-53, supra note 25. In footnote 44 of their report, the Commission ma-
jority noted: 
We believe that Congress envisioned that there be a multiple number of eco-
nomic factors causing injury in most cases. Hence, Congress used the plural 
"factors." The Senate Committee on Finance also envisioned that there could be 
a multiple number of factors causing injury. In its report on' the bill which be-
came the Trade Act, the Committee stated that the Commission would have to 
assure itself that imports were a substantial cause of injury "and not one of a 
multitude of equal causes" and that there could be "a variety of other causes" 
(other than increased imports) affecting an industry, including "changes in tech-~ 
nology or in consumer tastes, domestic competition from substitute products, 
plant obsolescence, or poor management. 
Id. at n. 44. 
31. No. TA-201-5I, USITC Publication No. 1553 (July 1984). 
32. Id. at 55 (views of Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr). 
33. Id. at 50. 
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these factors. s4 For several steel products the majority found that 
imports consistently undersold the domestic product.35 
In response to the contention advanced by a group of Canadian 
steel producers that long-term decline in demand was a more impor-
tant cause of injury to the domestic sheet and strip steel industry 
than imports, the ITC once again declined to aggregate the four fac-
tors responsible for this decline. S6 These four factors were: (1) the 
effect of increased importation of automobiles; (2) the decline in 
steel content of domestically produced auto:nobiJes; (3) the decline 
in domestic automobile sales; and (4) the substitution of aluminum 
cans for steel cans.37 Finding each of these to be independent causes 
of injury, the ITC rejected the contention that "these factors should 
be considered collectively as a single cause of injury. "38 Having re-
fused to cumulate factors, the ITC concluded that none of these four 
factors was a cause of injury more important than or equal to in-
creased imports. 
What was determinative for the ITC majority in finding in-
creased steel imports to be a substantial cause of injury was the fact 
that imports were rising in the face of declining domestic sales. Fur-
thermore, imports were underselling the competing domestic product 
and domestic prices were being suppressed.39 
In the third case, Unwrought Copper,40 a unanimous ITC found 
that imports of copper were a substantial cause of serious injury to 
the domestic copper mining industry. Unlike the two investigations 
just discussed, a unique element of this case was that the world price 
for the import under review was established through buying and sell-
ing on two ··exchanges, the London Metal Exchange and the· New 
York Commodity Exchange.4l Prices were thus determined by the 
relative levels of world supply and world demand!2 Despite a world-
wide glut of copper, developing countries were continuing to mine 
large quantities of it in order to enhance their foreign exchange 
holdings!S 
The ITC found that the depressed state of the domestic copper 
industry was a direct reflection of the low level of world prices for 
copper-prices which were passed through to the United States in-
34. [d. at 55. 
35. [d. at 57, 60, 62. 
36. [d. at 60-61. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 61. 
39. [d. at 62, 63. 
40. No. TA-201-52, USITC Publication No. 1549 (July 1984). 
41. . [d. at 6. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 7. 
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dustry via imports." In reaching its affirmative causation determina-
tion, the ITC discussed three economic factors which it concluded 
were not more important causes of serious injury than imports: (1) 
decline in demand; (2) cyclical changes related to the business cycle; 
and (3) world prices and factors of comparative advantage.41i 
Regarding decline in demand, the ITC found that product sub-
stitution and declining intensity of copper use in products containing 
copper were probably responsible for accelerating the decline of the 
domestic producers' market share.4e Nevertheless, when compared to 
increased imports, decline in demand was not considered to be a 
more important cause of injury.47 
As for cyclical changes, the ITC determined that copper con-
sumption partially reflected general economic trends, so that when 
general economic conditions were poor, so too was the state of the 
domestic copper industry.4s The ITC did not believe, however, "that 
Congress intended that a cyclical ,downturn per se be a cause of in-
jury."49 If it were otherwise, the ITC stated, it would invariably 
reach negative causation determinations whenever an escape clause 
petition was filed during an economic recession.Iio Instead, the busi-
ness cycle had to be considered when examining the impact of 
imports.IiI 
In connection with the third factor, world price and comparative 
advantage, the ITC considered the argument that the domestic in-
dustry's plight was mainly attributable to its inability to compete at 
the world price for copper because it lacked a comparative advan-
tage in copper production.Ii2 The ITC rejected out of hand the notion 
that it had to determine whether a domestic industry has a compara-
tive advantage in a product before making an affirmative recommen-
dation to the President.Ii3 The ITC reasoned that such a requirement 
would undermine the purpose of section 201, which is to give injured 
domestic industries breathing room in order to adjust and become 
competitive once again.Ci4 
Given these considerations, the ITC concluded that increased 
imports of copper were a substantial cause of serious injury to the 
44. Jd, at 6. 
45, Jd, at 10-11. 
46, Jd, at 11. 
47, Jd, at 12, The Commission offered no explanation for this conclusion. This indicates 
the subjective nature of the weighing process, 
48, Jd. 
49. Jd, 
50. Jd. 
51. Jd. 
52. Jd. at 13. 
53, Jd. at 15. 
54. Jd. 
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domestic copper industry.1I11 
How do these latest ITC determinations compare with its ear-
lier "substantial cause" findings under section 201? Insofar as the 
Certain Canned Tuna Fish determination is concerned, the ITC has 
previously cited overproduction as a causation factor more important 
than imports. lle Regarding the Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel 
Products decision, the ITC has on several occasions held that an in-
crease in imports (either actual or relative to domestic production), 
when coupled with a decline in the proportion of the domestic mar-
ket supplied by the domestic industry, establishes imports as a sub-
stantial cause of injury.1I7 Price undercutting and price suppression 
have likewise been found determinative.1I8 And in its Unwrought 
Copper determination, the ITC acted consistently with its latest de-
cision in which it has held that a downturn in the business cycle 
cannot give rise to a negative causation finding.1I9 
In short, these three determinations are well within the main-
stream of past ITC decisions. They certainly are not aberrational, 
nor do they indicate that the ITC has suddenly reversed course on 
the substantial cause standard. These three cases do not represent 
some novel interpretation of the law. Against this backdrop, the pro-
posed amendment to the "substantial cause" standard will be 
considered. 
55. /d. at 16. 
56. See, e.g .• Live Cattle and Certain Meat Products, No. TA-201-25, USITC Publica-
tion No. 834 (Sept. 1977). The other factor relied upon in that decision-the change in 
weather-may be idiosyncratic to this industry, given its apparently high dependence on 
favorable weather for economic good health. 
57. See. e.g., Clothespins, No. TA-201-36, USITC Publication No. 933 (Dec. 1978); 
Bicycle Tires and Tubes, No. TA-201-33, USITC Publication No. 910 (Sept. 1978); Televi-
sion Receivers, No. TA-201-19, USITC Publication No. 808 (Mar. 1977). These determina-
tions give clear indication that the Commission takes seriously its statutory mandate in 19 
U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) to consider these factors. 
58. See. e.g., Clothespins, No. TA-201-36, USITC Publication No. 933 (Dec. 1978); 
Sugar, No. TA-20\-16, USITC Publication No. 807 (Mar. 1977); Ferricyanide and Ferrocya-
nide Pigments, No. TA-201-11, USITC Publication No. 767 (Apr. 1976). 
59. See. e.g., Heavyweight Motorcycles, No. TA-201-47, USITC Publication No. 1342 
(Feb. 1983); Stainless Steel, No. TA-201-48, USITC Publication No. 1377 (May 1983); Con-
tra Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, No. TA-201-44, USITC 
Publication No. 1110 (Dec. 1980). See generally Escape Clause Causation. supra note 21. As 
noted by Commissioner Eckes in Heavyweight Motorcycles. supra, at 14-15: 
In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the significance of the present 
recession in my analysis. Without a doubt the unusual length and severity of the 
present recession has created unique problems for the domestic motorcycle in-
dustry. Without a doubt the rise in joblessness, particularly among blue-collar 
workers, who constitute the prime market for heavyweight motorcycles, has had 
a severe impact on the domestic industry. Nonetheless, if the Commission were 
to analyze the causation question in this way, it would be impossible in many 
cases for a cyclical industry experiencing serious injury to obtain relief under 
section 201 during a recession. In my opinion Congress could not have intended 
for the Commission to interpret the law this way. 
For an expression of similar views, see the separate opinion of Commissioner Stern in Stainless 
Steel, supra. 
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IV. Proposed Amendment to the "Substantial Cause" Standard 
A flurry of trade bills has been recently introduced in Congress. 
These bills are designed primarily to tighten and clarify rules of 
United States domestic international trade law.60 One of these bills, 
introduced in the Senate in April 1984, would delete the word "sub-
stantial" from section 201(b)(2)(C).61 This would make the causa-
tion criterion simply one of finding increased imports to be a "cause" 
of serious injury. 
This proposal is both unnecessary and ill-considered. There are 
several policy considerations which militate in favor of retaining the 
present causation standard. 
First, the "substantial cause" standard has not been a major 
stumbling block for domestic industries which have petitioned the 
ITC for escape clause relief. The number of recent negative ITC 
determinations attributable to inadequate causation findings has 
been quite few. In fact, through . September 1984 only one of five 
escape clause petitions for 1984 was denied because of a negative 
"substantial cause" finding.62 
Second, the substantial cause standard has been in existence 
now for ten years. Over this period, some fifty-three escape clause 
determinations have been issued by the ITC. There exists a devel-
oped body of decisional authority from which the Commission may 
draw in future cases. Moreover, interested parties may assess in ad-
vance the likelihood of their success should they decide to either file 
or oppose an escape clause petition.63 
Third, given the difficulty, if not impossibility, of quantifying 
the degree to which anyone factor may be causing harm vis-a-vis 
60. See. e.g., S. 2380, H.R. 5081, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (steel import legisla-
tion); H.R. 3795, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (wine equity legislation); H.R. 4784, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984). 
61. S. 2524, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Copper and Extractive Industries Fair Com-
petition Act of 1984). The bill would amend § 201(b)(2)(C) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 
U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(2)(C) (1982). It would also eliminate the President's discretion to withhold 
relief, and would make relief mandatory for a minimum of three years following an affirmative 
ITC determination. 
62. In addition to the three § 201 determinations discussed above, the other two deci-
sions in 1984 are Nonrubber Footwear, No. TA-21O-50, USITC Publication No. 1545 (July 
1984), and Stainless Steel Table Flatware, No. TA-201-49, USITC Publication No. 1536 
(June 1984). These latter two determinations were negative based on an absence of serious 
injury. 
In the ten-year period in which § 201 has been in existence, the Commission has issued 27 
affirmative § 201 determinations out of a total of 53 cases. Of that total, three determinations 
were split. See Adams & Dirlam, supra note 12, at 578-99, (summary of findings on § 201 
decisions in which the authors indicate'that in its first nineteen § 201 cases the Commission 
reached negative determinations in only two cases because of inadequate causation); An Ex-
amination of fTC Determinations. supra note 21 (author surveys the first forty-two escape 
clause determinations, concluding that in fourteen instances imports were not a substantial 
cause of serious injury). 
63. In one commentator's view, "[tJhis is a reasonably clear and understandable stan-
dard." Berg, supra note 12, at 4i5. 
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imports, it is far from clear that a mere "cause" standard will appre-
ciably ease the domestic industry's burden of proof. A change in the 
causation standard is not, therefore, a panacea for the domestic 
industry. 
Fourth, the focus of the escape clause is relief from fairly 
traded import competition. Thus, while the causation standard in 
section 201 is one of the strictest in United States trade law, there is 
at the same time no requirement that a petitioner prove dumping, 
subsidization, or other unfair trade practices. 
Fifth, there is a serious question of whether the proposed change 
to the causation standard is consistent with our international obliga-
tions under GATT. By entering into GATT, the United States com-
mitted itself to a world system of gradually freer trade than had 
existed prior to World War IV'· An integral part of that commit-
ment was elimination of quantitative restrictions6Ci and gradual re-
duction and eventual elimination of tariffs.66 Making escape clause 
relief easier to obtain would subvert the GATT objective of achiev-
ing an open world trading system.67 
A relaxation of section 201 's causation standard could result in 
more frequent imposition of quantitative restrictions and increased 
tariffs as forms of escape clause relief. Not only would such a result 
contravene the spirit of GATT, it would also violate the letter of 
GAIT because it would nullify and impair trade concessions inuring 
to the benefit of adversely affected trading partners.68 In such an 
event, any trading partner so affected by escape clause relief would 
be legally entitled to retaliate in order to compensate itself for the 
nullification and impairment of GAIT benefits which it had previ-
ously negotiated and concluded with the United States.69 
Such compensation in the form of "substantially equivalent con-
cessions" will naturally mean that an American industry which hap-
pens to export products to that foreign country may very well find 
itself the target (and victim) of retaliation.70 This targeting occurs 
even though that domestic industry was in no way responsible for the 
section 201 relief. The lesson is simple: when the United States re-
stricts fairly traded imports in one sector of the economy under the 
64. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 553. 
65. GAIT, supra note 9, at arts. XI, XIII. 
66. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 205·40. 
67. Among Congress' purposes in enacting the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 
U.S.C. § 1671 (1982), for example, were "to foster the growth and maintenance of an open 
world trading system" and "to expand opportunities for the commerce of the United States in 
international trade." Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 146, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2502(2)&(3) 
(1982). 
68. GAIT, supra note 9, at arts. XIX, XXIII. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 163-89, 
564-66. 
69. GAIT, supra note 9, at art. XIX, 11 3(a). See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 564-66. 
70. [d. 
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escape clause, export trade in another unrelated sector will most 
likely be affected in kind.71 
A final reason for retaining the substantial cause standard re-
lated to the one just mentioned has to do with the scope of relief. 
Unlike a dumping investigation under the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, in which relief is foreign manufacturer specific,72 or a subsidy 
determination under that same Act, in which countervailing duties 
are imposed on the specific article from a specific country,73 escape 
clause relief is indiscriminate in scope. Such relief generally affects 
all imports of the particular product under investigation, regardless 
of the country, ma.nufacturer, or producer involved.7• Because escape 
clause relief may be so broad in scope, affecting all fairly traded 
imports of a given article, the higher "substantial cause" standard is 
entirely justifiable. It strikes a balance between occasionally protect-
ing domestic industries suffering serious injury from competing im-
ports on the one hand and promoting an open world trading system 
on the other. 
V. Conclusion 
The potentially harsh consequences to our foreign trading part-
ners if the escape clause causation standard is relaxed militates in 
favor of retaining the more stringent "substantial cause" standard. 
The specter of retaliation which will adversely affect sectors of the 
American economy exporting their products to those trading part-
ners likewise warrants retention of the current standard of causation. 
71. The recent dispute between the United States and the European Economic Com-
munity over compensatory trade concessions to the EEC in exchange for its agreement to limit 
the volume of steel exports to the United States under the October 1982 steel arrangement 
illustrates the possible results. For a background'description of those negotiations, see Bureau 
of National Affairs, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 52, 93 (Oct. 12 & 19, 1983). 
72. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). 
73. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982). 
74. 19 U.S.c. § 2253 (1982). Although this section allows for the negotiation of "or-
derly marketing arrangements" with foreign countries from which the articles are imported, 
the President has negotiated such arrangements in only two instances. See Footwear, No. TA-
201-18, USITC Publication No. 799 (Feb. 1977); Television Receivers, No. TA-201-19, 
USITC Publication No. 808 (Mar. 1977). 
In the recently decided steel escape clause determination, the President stated his inten-
tion to negotiate such an arrangement. See The Shrinking of the Steel Industry, N. Y. Times, 
Sept. 23, 1984, § 3, at 4; Reagan's Sugar-Coated Protectionism, Washington Post, Sept. 23, 
1984, § G, at I, 7. 
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